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A RESPONSE TO REVIEWS OF
REASONS FOR HOPE
JOHN PUNSHON

I

would like to begin by thanking the three Friends who have provided such thoughtful and provoking comments on my book. One
cannot take up every interesting point that has been raised, so I would
like to respond in respect of four matters: inward and immediate revelation, the nature of the Richmond Declaration, the status of scripture, and Friends and the Holiness Revivals. Before engaging in
discussion with them, I would like to say something about how the
book came to be written, since this will cast light on my responses,
and why it was I who wrote it.
Some time ago I was invited to have lunch with some of the then
members of the FUM staff. I guessed that I was one of a number of
folks whose opinions they were canvassing about the role and calling
of FUM. All well-run institutions do this sort of thing fairly frequently, and I guess the process is in the nature of a reality-check. I
rather think it was about the time of the last realignment controversy, and it may have been this that influenced what I had to say.
I remember suggesting that decision-making at FUM sometimes
seemed to take the form of a trade-off between the interests of its liberal and evangelical constituencies.
What FUM needed was a sense of identity that grew out of its
core convictions rather than one imposed upon it by the need to
maintain its position as a centrist body in the US Quaker spectrum.
This is a counsel of perfection, but what lay behind it was a sense that
FUM was being carried along by the stream rather than steering a
course. I may have been mistaken about that, but such was my
impression. The book is my attempt to suggest to FUM what its identity is.
The second thing that made me write was the particular curricular need that I had at ESR at the time. Believing that liberal and evangelical Quakerism are intrinsically interesting, I decided to offer a
course on each. But what texts could I use? The unprogrammed
branch, the FGC tradition, however one might describe it, is prolific.
25
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The question, “What does it mean to be a Quaker?” is asked over and
over in all sorts of ways and in all sorts of places. There was no problem there. When I turned to evangelical Quakerism, however, I was
obliged to borrow copies of the out-of-print reprint of Gurney’s
Observations rejoicing in the exciting and dynamic title, “A Peculiar
People.” There was no extended and up-to-date enquiry into the
nature of evangelical Quakerism for me to use. If I wanted one, I had
to write one.
Now I am not the right person to do this, for goodness sake!
What do I know? I grew up in liberal Quaker circles, though many
regarded me as unacceptably conservative in my outlook. (I was, and
remain, an orthodox Christian of ecumenical rather than sectarian
preferences—evangelical, even, when you see what the mainstream is
doing to the faith.) I was, and shall remain, a member of Indiana
Yearly Meeting, and so sound was my doctrine that they conspired to
record me as a minister. So I can do some things right. But what I do
not have is extended experience, and I had to produce a theoretical
book that would have been much better if it had been written by
someone who grew up in an evangelical yearly meeting instead of
being adopted by one relatively late in life. Stand up all those of you
who could have done it better and didn’t! Since you did not undertake the task, you have to have my account of evangelical Quakerism
faute de mieux.
Before getting down to detail, I want to say something about my
general approach to the subject. While I am not post-liberal in theology, I am convinced that in modern circumstances it is helpful and
productive to talk theology in terms of traditions in the MacIntyrean
sense: arguments extended over fairly long periods of time in which
certain fundamental agreements are considered and reconsidered in
terms of external criticism and internal critique. When writing the
book I realized that this was the way I customarily thought, and this
was the way I was going to have to approach my material.
The advantage of doing this is what I said in the early part of the
book. To produce definitions of “Quakerism” and “Evangelicalism”
would shift the focus from the subject matter I chose to write about,
to maintaining and defending the perhaps arbitrary definitions I
would have produced at the beginning. I deliberately chose not to do
that in order to give myself freedom. There are gains and losses, of
course, and I am willing to live with them. The biggest danger in this
approach is that one might avoid making distinctions when they
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ought to be made. Gayle Beebe has unerringly put his finger on one
of those places, but more of that anon.
On the other hand, the advantage is that one can connect a recent
or familiar phenomenon to a much broader context. Quakerism did
not spring fully armed from the head of George Fox, but it represents
what is to my mind a powerful contribution to the longer Christian
tradition. In the same way that one cannot understand Protestantism
without Catholicism, one cannot see early Quakerism in the round
without Puritanism. From this viewpoint, seventeenth-century
Quakerism and nineteenth-century American revivalism are both the
children of Puritanism. They have points of agreement and disagreement, and that is the internal debate of the tradition. I resisted definitions because my primary interest is in the terms of this debate. Let
us take, for example, the nature of our knowledge of God.

KNOWLEDGE

OF

GOD

It would be hard, in fact, to imagine a matter more fundamental to
theology than the status of epistemology. I am grateful for Arthur’s
reinforcement, in plainer language, of what I was trying to say, in his
section, “Scripture and Spirit.” I would certainly grant that the
covenant community—collectively sensitive to the voice of Christ,
utilizing inward revelation, scripture and right reason—will be rightly guided. But I think Friends have had great difficulty in maintaining that position over time, as our history shows. This is my point
about instability. If one asserts that inward immediate revelation possesses a certainty guaranteed by its immediacy, knowledge derived
from other sources is less certain and less reliable. In circumstances of
controversy, a claim of inward and immediate revelation, sometimes
made by a number of people, as in Arthur’s example, will necessarily
trump claims by others, which rest on induction of some other sort.
The problem is that the inductive knowledge may be true and the
supposed revelation false.
If we step outside the Quaker frame of reference, we can raise a
philosophical question here. Are the ideas generated by immediate
revelation recognizable because of the innate structure of the mind?
Is that what produces certainty? If they are, then we immediately run
into the Kantian roadblock. Barclay’s Necessity and Immediacy seems
to me to imply that we think categorically, and this places Quakerism
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in the post-Cartesian world, where certainty is the only real kind of
knowledge. Now if Barclay believes that this point is irrelevant
because God supplies the capacity to understand with the content of
understanding, he is back with a tabula rasa and is then in the position of having to say why impressions from without should have less
veracity than impressions from within.
And so on. I wish this were a conversation and not an essay taking shape in a word processor, because I would like to refine this
argument a bit. When I said that Friends have been bequeathed an
unstable metaphysics, I was indicating that Barclay’s way of thinking
leads to a deductive rather than an inductive method, which encourages resorting to divine guidance as a first, rather than a last, resort.
There is thus no answer to all kinds of interpretations which see
Quakerism as constituted by its method rather than its doctrines,
which is what the idea of continuing revelation now comes down to
in many places. As I also said somewhere in the book, undue concentration on the inward light can prevent us from seeing what the
outward light is telling us.

THE RICHMOND DECLARATION
The Richmond Declaration, however, is generally criticized for being
too open to the outer light (as some think, darkness) and not sensitive enough to the inner, because it ignores the traditional categories
of Quaker thought and expression in favor of an evangelical mode of
expression and underlying theology. It should be clear from what I
say in the book that (a) I think the Quaker tradition needs to be
developed and cannot simply return old answers to new questions,
always assuming the new questions have substance; and (b) fresh
responses, informed but not determined by what has previously been
believed, are what provides the lifeblood of a tradition in the terms I
postulated above. The life is in the controversy. If this is true about
intellectual traditions in general, it will indeed be true about the
Quaker tradition in particular.
So how then do we look at the Richmond Declaration, still capable of raising very strong feelings among Friends? Gayle remarks that
I critique the Declaration as both a statement of faith and a response
to political realities, implying that my critique is a criticism. I am
sorry if I have given that impression. In fact, the document would be
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quite sterile if it were not both of those things, and Gayle is quite
right. Once more we see the definition of tradition at work in controversy.
Arthur, also, is certainly right that the Richmond Conference
marks a conciliar stand. Since the Hicksites were not there, it cannot
have been an ecumenical council of Friends, though it is unlikely,
even at that stage of history, that common ground could have been
found between the two wings. For the purposes of the evangelical
tradition, therefore, we are entitled to consider it as authoritative
because it represents a strong consensus of opinion, at any rate,
among leading Friends.
If we look at this leadership group, then, what do we find? The
Conference comes hot on the heels of the Ohio decision of 1886 not
to discriminate against ministers who participated in the ordinances,
which is, perhaps, the high water mark of the Ordinance Crisis. The
Conference Declaration makes strong statements about a variety of
matters but it appeals to scripture as an authority, not reason or tradition. If I interpret him correctly, Tom Hamm sees the gathering as
a move by what he calls the “moderate” party against the adherents
of the holiness revival among Friends. This is why I see the
Declaration as a line drawn in the sand against further movement in
the direction of Wesleyanism. It seems to me that modernism as a hot
issue post-dates Richmond somewhat. That the Declaration had the
effect Arthur claims, I would certainly accept, but I am not sure that
this was a large part of what the framers of it had in mind when they
wrote it.
Controversy over the Richmond Declaration has always centered
on how “Quaker” it is. Naturally those who dislike it say that it does
not reflect the tradition strongly enough, those who like it take the
opposite view. Gayle takes me to task strongly over the place of “tradition” in my argument and senses that I think there is some sort of
“real” Quakerism with which I compare evangelical Quakerism unfavorably. Again, if I have given this impression, I regret it. By looking
at Quakerism as a tradition, I was trying to avoid this sort of conclusion.
I may have confused the issue by using the word “tradition”
ambiguously. In places I have used the more technical sense of any
formal controversy extended through time which has certain limits
defined by both internal and external influences. At other times I
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have written about the Quaker tradition, meaning the heritage in a
vague sort of way, perhaps giving the impression that I espouse a set
of doctrines or values classically stated at some time in the past to
which we should defer.
It was no part of my purpose to give authority to the “tradition”
in this second sense. I certainly do not believe that the early Friends
are the “real” Friends and evangelical Friends are in some sense
deviant. My frame of reference is that the early and second-generation
Friends marked a clear point of departure from the Puritanism of their
day. They were recognized as a separate church with a distinctive form
of Christianity. They were criticized from without, and they had their
own internal debates. Their ideas continue to have vitality and provide the intellectual groundwork that forms the basis of much of our
faith and practice today. There is both agreement and disagreement
among both us and them, and we should recognize this.
I do not defer to Fox because he was the first Friend; I defer to
him because I think he was right. This does not mean that I agree
with him completely, because I do not; nor because I think he has all
the answers to my problems, which he doesn’t. But he does institute
a tradition in the first of my two senses as well as the second. It is the
first that makes him interesting. Personally, I do not have much interest in the tradition in the second sense.
So when I say that George Fox “stated the Quaker position classically,” and that “An evangelical Quakerism that denies this…has
probably parted company with its Quaker component…” one should
not rush to the conclusion that I have “capitulated” to Fox. I have
just argued that evangelical Christianity is prone to emphasize the
authority of scripture rather than the authority of the Holy Spirit, and
that at Ulverston Fox reverses this order of priority. Pentecostalism
aside, I do not think I am wrong about this. It is a matter of judgment about which we can disagree. I read evangelical commentators
today who would not have chosen Fox’s words, but would substantially agree with him against many of their precursors in their own traditions. Hence, one kind of evangelical Quakerism will follow one
order of priority, or another. It is precisely to cover this subtlety that
I took the risk of not defining terms; note the indefinite article.
I can understand how I might seem to vacillate between being an
advocate and an adversary of evangelical Quakerism. That comes
from my background and experience, I guess, though my purpose is
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entirely sympathetic. When I used the words “superficially resemble,”
I was thinking of a liberal Friend who said to me that she had once
been to a programmed meeting and concluded there was nothing
Quaker about it. This was superficial. Both a liberal Friend and a
Nazarene might attend a Friends meeting and draw very different,
and erroneous, conclusions about the nature of this faith community
in terms of their previous expectations, and this is where the superficiality arises. In the Introduction I suggested that evangelical
Quakerism is a vigorous hybrid and that is why it is difficult to categorize. It inclines in part to evangelicalism and in part to its Quaker
past, but neither is enough on its own to explain why the two elements have combined so successfully.

INERRANCY

AND INFALLIBILITY

This leads me to my final comment about Gayle. I am grateful for his
comments about changing attitudes to the doctrine of inerrancy. The
purpose of this section of the chapter on scripture was to draw the distinction between infallibility and inerrancy as sharply as I could in
order to provide encouragement and assistance for anybody for
whom this is still a problem. I should perhaps have said that it is a
“fundamentalist shibboleth” in this connection, rather than an evangelical one, for I am aware that many evangelicals do not in fact
believe in inerrancy, and am glad to be reminded of it. I am also sure
that large numbers do, though, on an official and unofficial basis. The
Southern Baptist Convention with over 15 million members still
states that the scriptures are “…without any mixture of error,” for
example, as does the Lutheran Church Missouri Synod, though that
is much smaller in comparison. In feeling that infallibility is not to be
taken as a synonym for inerrancy, I wished to spell out the difference.
Indeed, there are places where the issue is still alive. Christianity
Today reports that at the November 2002 annual meeting of the
Evangelical Theological Society, a resolution was passed questioning
the memberships of Clark Pinnock and John Sanders on the grounds
that they had violated the inerrancy clause of the ETS constitution.
Underlying this is the issue of Open Theism, but the magazine
reports that the two theologians were charged with “promoting proposals ‘incompatible with inerrancy.’” It also reported that “Others
debated the validity of the inerrancy challenge, saying its function is
to ensure that whatever conclusions are reached are grounded in
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Scripture. Many affirmed that arguments on both sides of the open
theism controversy are grounded in Scripture, which means this is a
legitimate debate within the society.”

FRIENDS

AND THE

HOLINESS MOVEMENT

Finally, let us turn to the issue of holiness. Of all the chapters in the
book this is the one that required the most work, and in the end, was
the most interesting to write. The word “holiness” can be used in different senses. It can be taken to indicate a religious experience, while
also standing for an identifiable historical movement. I use it in both
senses and accept readily what Carole says about my comparative
neglect of the first sense.
There is an issue here in the relationship between holiness and
perfection. Early Quakerism possessed a doctrine of perfection which
only gradually, it appears, ceased to be a significant item of faith. One
suspects that without Wesleyan fervor, it lacked the emotional intensity necessary to sustain it. In the passages I cite in connection with
convincement, that fervor is certainly there. However, a doctrine of
perfection as the culmination of a long period of personal religious
discipline, i.e. gradual sanctification, is very unlikely to produce this
result. Hence, the theology best suited to sustain a doctrine of perfection is that of the second blessing. Hence also the claim that convincement, in the early sense, indicates exactly this experience.
At first sight this seems an extraordinary suggestion. But Carole
suggests what might make it so, namely this. In recent decades it has
been difficult to talk about mysticism because the word has become a
code word for all sorts of liberal and humanistic trends among
Friends. This development has prevented us from seeing the phenomenon in its proper light and from understanding it accordingly.
Holiness, she suggests, is another such word ripe for rescue. She is, in
my opinion, absolutely right about this. Mysticism in one definition
is direct unmediated experience of God (That again!). If a conversion
experience is not precisely that, I don’t know what is. A revived interest in the mystical tradition among evangelical Friends is long overdue. I remember how delighted I was when I opened Arthur Roberts’
festschrift, Truth’s Bright Embrace, *(ed. by Paul Anderson and
Howard Macy, Newberg, Oregon: George Fox University Press,
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1996) and saw that Gayle Beebe had contributed an essay on “The
Nature of Mysticism.”
Carole also raises the question of how Quaker and Wesleyan
understandings of holiness diverge. As an aside, let me say I used the
word “avowedly” to refer to those yearly meetings who identified
themselves by use of the word in their names. I included Central
Yearly Meeting because its Discipline identifies itself as such (I
believe). That other bodies include holiness principles I readily
accept, but I think their histories would show a compromise with,
rather than a wholesale adoption of, Wesleyan Holiness doctrines.
That was really my point, but I am ready to be corrected if needed.
Now this is partly a matter of methodology. One is faced with a
development a century and a half old. Both evangelical Quakerism
and the Wesleyan Holiness movement have been through some major
changes in the course of it. From the standpoint of my original definition, Friends have been engaged in an interpretative debate over a
challenging idea arising outside the tradition. The challenge is to see
whether it should be adopted or accepted and modified in view of
already existing ideas and practices.
The necessity of the second work of grace is a Wesleyan doctrine,
which, actually, I accept. I fail to see, as Wesley did, how a sinner can
enter heaven. The question is how we are perfected by grace in anticipation of our translation to glory. The Holiness movement overlooked Wesley’s misgivings about doubtful claims to perfection
among his followers in England and went for the full-blown crisis
experience. Friends, I surmise, were very much in Wesley’s position,
since they preached perfection but did not claim it. I guess that in
each case perfection was an embarrassing consequence that flowed for
the particular theological means used to circumvent the rigors of the
doctrine of predestination.
So how can we assess this situation? In terms of subjective personal experience, I have suggested there is little or no difference
between the convincement experience of the seventeenth century and
the second work of grace in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
At a given point in time a certain subject goes through a certain experience which is characterized as a sense of losing their sinful nature
through the operation of divine grace. The differences between convincement and the second work of grace emerge in the period fol-
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lowing the experience and when theologically inclined persons try to
reach an estimate of what has occurred.
Certain questions seem to arise. First, is perfection the end-point
of the process of gradual sanctification or does the second blessing
interrupt the process of gradual sanctification? Second, is it possible
to prepare for the possibility of the second blessing, or does it always
come apparently arbitrarily? Third, by what means can the community verify an individual claim—are there indicators by which the genuineness of a claim can be made? Carole asks how Quaker and
Wesleyan understandings of holiness diverge. On this analysis we can
make several conjectures.
In terms of the subjective experience, the accounts we have of
convincement are so steeped in seventeenth-century language that it
would probably be impossible to replicate them, so to understand
them we will inevitably have to use a different terminology. In some
ways they are conversion experiences; in other ways they look mystical. They may be a form of the “second work of grace,” or they may
be unique. On the other hand, convincement and second blessing
may both be examples of something we now have more adequate
means to describe, and a revisitation of Quakerism and mysticism
might be very fruitful in this connection.
In terms of practicalities, Friends seem to have begun by preaching a crisis experience but later to have accommodated themselves to
reality by plumping for gradual sanctification with the remote
prospect of perfection as its crown. One suspects that many members
(and ex-members) of holiness churches have in fact settled for that
also. Strictly speaking, this is less than holiness in Wesleyan Revival
terms. But in terms of the argument I make about sacrifice and the
covenant, holiness is in part a condition conferred with justification,
an awkward conclusion in view of Quakerism’s hostility to positional
theology, but it seems to me an unavoidable one. The consequence is
that holiness is not equivalent to perfection. That is why there has to
be a second work.
In terms of outcomes there is a difference too. The most striking,
to my mind, is that Quaker first principles include a dimension of
social morality which goes beyond the personal. This was a response
to the circumstances of the seventeenth century and codified in the
testimonies, which also included (as tends to be forgotten), but went
well beyond, the rigorous but narrow personal morality which the
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Holiness movement produced. As I also point out in the book,
English Methodism resembles Quakerism in this respect far more
closely than it represents the Holiness movement in the United
States. Within the Quaker tradition there is an engagement with society on a much wider range of issues.
So this is the outline of my reply to Carole’s question. Perfection
is the logical consequence of Quaker doctrine, but it can be accomplished in more than one way. It is certainly a work of grace, but
needs to be prepared for. It is the fruit of discernment and obedience
rather than faith. Interest in the second work of grace is therefore
tangential to these concerns and does not arise naturally out of the
Quaker tradition; hence the difficulty in harmonizing the two understandings of holiness neatly, in spite of their obvious similarities.
Finally, the Quaker tradition goes rather further than the Holiness
movement in terms of discipleship, adding a social morality to a personal morality which thereby produces a different scale of values.
Nevertheless, as Carole has reminded me more than once, love
lies at the heart of holiness, and Wesley was fond of the phrase “perfect love” (1 John 4:18). This is the nub of the matter, I think.
Holiness is a term we use in connection with (to draw an artificial distinction) spirituality and discipleship. We should not get carried away,
as I often am, by the fascination and intellectual challenge these ideas
present, so that we forget what they are for.

